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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff/Appellee,

:

v.

:

Case No. 20010308-CA

DANIEL DUANE ETHERINGTON II, :
Defendant/Appellant.

:

BRIEF OF APPELLEE

JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This is an appeal from a conviction of assault by prisoner, a third degree felony, in
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-102.5 (1999); in the Fourth Judicial District Court,
Utah County, State of Utah, the Honorable Lynn W. Davis presiding. This Court has
jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78-2a-3(2)(e) (1996).

STATEMENT OF ISSUE PRESENTED ON APPEAL
AND STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW
Issue: Is defendant's conduct of using a table to slam a deputy into a wall more
specifically governed by the assault by prisoner statute than by the assault on a
correctional officer statute, which requires that the defendant "throw[] or otherwise
propel[]" an object at the deputy?

1

Standard of Review: This issue is one of statutory interpretation. ''Questions of
statutory interpretation are questions of law, which we review for correctness giving no
deference to the trial court's interpretations." State v. Paul, 860 P.2d 992, 993 (Utah
App. 1993).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-102.5 (1999)—Assault by prisoner.
Any prisoner who commits assault, intending to cause bodily injury,
is guilty of a felony of the third degree.
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-102.6 (1999)—Assault on a correctional officer.
Any prisoner who throws or otherwise propels fecal material or any
other substance or object at a peace or correctional officer is guilty of a
class A misdemeanor.
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-102 (Supp. 2001)—Assault.
(1) Assault is:
(a) an attempt, with unlawful force or violence, to do bodily injury to
another;
(b) a threat, accompanied by a show of immediate force or violence, to do
bodily injury to another; or
(c) an act, committed with unlawful force or violence, to do bodily injury to
another.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant was charged by information with assault by prisoner, a third degree
felony, and criminal mischief, a class A misdemeanor. R. 5A. Following his preliminary
hearing, defendant moved to amend the information from assault by prisoner to assault on

2

a correctional ot'fi xi\ a ilass \ inisdemeanoi. iv. JZ :U. The trul court denied
defer *

o^-o^.

• At trial, defendant moved for a directed verdict as to the crimin.il mischief .:harge.
R. 70-72. He also moved for a jury in<u
a correctional r - *

,-.; charge of assault on

The court granted both motions, J Following the

tn; 11 i IK: 11irv convicted defendant of assault by prisoner. Id,
Defendant was sentenced to the statutory indetoi inmate (mson tn in . \\ /ero-to-five
years

p

. . .u y jppeak \W M nl » ,Miri 's denial of his motion to amend the

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS1
Defendant, an inmate at the I i'lali t JUIIIY f.III irpeaUNlk used personal items in his
cell including paj
|ii(

nis bedding to cover the lens of the security camera

iint in his cell. R. 144:84-85, 96-99.2 Defendant's actions were considered security

violations. R. 144:78, 84, 100. Although defendant « ts «anii;ti tn i tw>$ his Jt*sti uctive
behavior, he continued to disobey

4:98-99.

i in Vtober 1 *), 2000, due to defendant's continued misbehavior, Deputy Gregory

'The facts are recited in a light most favorable to the jury's verdict. See State v.
Loose, 2000 UT 11, f 2, 994 P.2d 1237.
2

Due to his prior misbehavior, defendant was housed in solitary confinement at thai
time, R. 144:73-74, 79-80, 94-95. Video cameras are placed in the solitary confinement
cells to prevent inmates from harming themselves or destroying jail property R 144:7980,96.
3

Knapp, a disciplinary officer, conducted a tape recorded disciplinary hearing with
defendant. R. 144:55-57, 75-76. The hearing was held in an eight foot by ten foot
interview room inside the jail. R. 144:57. The door, located on the west side of the room,
contained a viewing window three feet high and two feet wide. R. 144:57-58, 105.
Inside the room was a heavy table measuring four feet long and two-and-a-half feet wide,
two chairs, and a tape recorder. R. 142; 144:57-58, 67.
When the hearing began, Deputy Knapp sat in the chair across the table from
defendant, nearest the east wall. R. 144:58. Defendant was seated opposite to Deputy
Knapp, in the west chair with his back to the door. Id. The door was shut during the
interview. Id. For security reasons, Deputy Brian Casper and three other officers,
witnessed the interview through the door window from the hallway outside the room. R.
144:105-06.
Deputy Knapp initiated the interview by informing defendant of the allegations
against him and of his rights in answering the allegations. R. 144:58-59.3 However,
when given the opportunity to respond to the allegations, defendant refused, stating that
he would appeal the deputy's decision. R. 144:59-61. Defendant also refused to call
witnesses, stating that he had witness statements but that he wouLd not show them to
Deputy Knapp. R. 144:60. Defendant's demeanor was argumentative throughout the
hearing. R. 144:61.
3

Deputy Knapp, an experienced hearing officer, conducted the disciplinary hearing
according to jail policy. R. 144:60-61, 74-75, 98. Defendant had been through other
disciplinary hearings and was presumably familiar with the hearing process. See id.
4

Given, detendiini s I'.niure to refute the allegations, Deputy Knapp found defendant
§-.

' emitting the allegations and breaking jail rules. R, 144:6 (-i"-i Deputy knapp

then informed defendant that all the items used to cover th J
removed from defendant > L CI I I I M J .
agitated 11 id ,.' 11 < I

" i 111<.i j • -. -1.. i, defendant became extremely

11 i ouch any of my personnel [sic] stuff, when we get back [to my

I'm going to break your neck, straight up. Those are my personal, legal papers) I R
144:63, 106. The deputy attempted to cal»ii tk/fei-tjaiii iiv >•> pi nrung that he would not
negotiate with defendant, .uid ili.n I'WVndnnfs personal items were already being
- JCU. 11.144:64. In response, defendant raised a few inches oir *
chair, leaned toward the deputy, and yelled "I f v^n tnuH
have a right to use force to defend
14«it)4, nu„

allu k

;-i-\ if you start this shitf.]" R.

iir',ii,K k n*i|'P instructed defendant to sit back down. R. 144:64. Still

arguing, defendant complied. Id.
Deputy Knapp then informed defendant i
possessions back through good in;k,:u n

to earn his

I"1 144:64-65. Clenching his fists above the

tabic, '(etemluit yelled "There is f[uck]ing legal documents, discoveries [sic|„ and I «.
got an f[uck]ing trial coming up in twenty f[uck]ing days. 11 * i »u i] u. K (int?, i -uch it, you
are going to get your f[uck]ing ass kickrdj. |M R 144.65-66. Fearing that defendant would
aiiatk him, 1 k-put K lupp again tried to calm defendant by reiterating that his possessions
had already been removed from his cell and that he could earn them h,k K I I 11 66-67.

At that instant, defendant moved his hands under the table, and forcefully tipped
the table into the deputy's lap. R. 144:67. As Deputy Knapp fell from his chair,
defendant shoved the table against the deputy, slamming him into the east wall. R.
144:67-68. Trying to keep his balance and to push defendant away, Deputy Knapp placed
his left hand on the east wall and his nght hand on defendant's throat. R. 144:67-69.
Despite the deputy's efforts, defendant continued to use the table to force Deputy Knapp
against the wall. R. 144:68. The force of defendant's actions caused one of the heavy
metal table legs to break off. R. 142; 144:67.
Upon viewing defendant's actions through the door window, Deputy Casper and
the other officers immediately entered the room and restrained defendant. R. 144:70,
106-12. Later, defendant was given a medical examination for a minor scratch on his
neck. R. 144:72, 126-27. Deputy Knapp was unhurt in the incident. R. 144:72.
At trial, Deputy Casper testified that he saw defendant place his hands under the
table and then stand up, bringing the table up with him. R. 144:107.4 He then observed
defendant "driving his legs forward towards [sic] [Deputy] Knapp with the table." Id.
Defendant also testified at trial. R. 144:118-44. When asked about his actions on
direct examination, defendant admitted that he "got up a little bit quick and [] knocked the

4

Although Deputy Casper initially described defendant's actions in his report as
"throwing the table," on cross examination he explained that by "throwing" he meant that
defendant "turnfed]" the table, "bringing [it] up off the ground" into Deputy Knapp. R.
144:112-13.
6

table over because [he] had [his] hands in [his] lap/' R. 144:125. Defendant further
explained his actions to the jury by stating, "I stood up . . . and I kind of pushed [the
table] over, and pushed [it] a little bit. And then when it was in my way, I just kind of
picked it up a little b i t . . . and I pushed it against [Deputy Knapp] to get him to let me
go." Id. Defendant also described his action as "overturn[ing]" the table. R. 144:128.
On cross-examination, defendant admitted that he "grabbed [the table] and tipped it
over." R. 144:135-36. He also stated that "the table was turned over" and that he "got
upset and flipped over the table." R. 144:136-37, 142. Defendant never claimed to have
thrown or propelled the table into Deputy Knapp. R. 144:118-44.
ARGUMENT SUMMARY
Defendant was charged with assault by prisoner, a third degree felony, for
threatening a deputy, overturning a table onto the deputy's lap, and then using that table
to slam the deputy into a wall. On appeal, defendant claims that his conduct more
specifically fit within the offense of assault on a correctional officer, and that under State
v. Hill9 the trial court erred in denying his motion to amend the information to the lesser
charge. Defendant's reliance on Hill is misplaced. Defendant's conduct of overturning a
table onto a deputy's lap and slamming him into a wall does not fit within the narrow
"throws or otherwise propels" element of section 76-5-102.6—assault on a correctional
officer. Rather, his acts fit more specifically the elements of assault by prisoner—he
assaulted the deputy with a table with the intent to cause bodily injury.

7

ARGUMENT
DEFENDANT'S CONDUCT FELL MORE
SPECIFICALLY WITHIN THE ELEMENTS OF
ASSAULT BY PRISONER, AND NOT WITHIN THE
ELEMENTS OF ASSAULT ON A CORRECTIONAL
OFFICER AS DEFENDANT CONTENDS.
Defendant claims that his conduct fell more specifically under assault on a
correctional officer, a class A misdemeanor, and that the trial court should have therefore
granted his motion to amend the information. Br. of Aplt. at 8-9.5 Defendant relies on
State v. Hill, 688 P.2d 450 (Utah 1984) to support his argument. Br. of Aplt. at 9-10.
In Hill, the defendant received $2,100 in cash from an undercover agent for one
ounce of baking soda, which the defendant claimed was "good" cocaine. See Hill, 688
P.2d at 451. Hill was convicted of second degree felony theft by deception, and appealed
on the ground that his conduct was more specifically covered by a statute prohibiting
distribution of an imitation of a controlled substance. See id. The Supreme Court agreed,
largely on the ground that the Controlled Substances Act contained a specific section
making its provisions controlling over any other conflicting statutory provision. See id.
The Court concluded that "when an individual's conduct can be construed to be in

'Before the trial court, defendant argued that under State v. Shondel, 453 P.2d 146
(Utah 1969), the assault by prisoner and the assault on a correctional officer statutes
proscribe essentially the same conduct, and therefore, he claimed that he was entitled to
the lesser offense. See R. 35-50. However, defendant has abandoned that claim on
appeal. See SME Industries, Inc. v. Thompson, Ventulette, Stainback and Associates, Inc.,
2001 UT 54, f 46 n. 12, 28 P.3d 669 (arguments abandoned on appeal are waived and
should not be addressed).
8

violation of two overlapping statutes, the more specific statute governs." Id.
Contrary to defendant's claim, his conduct is more specifically covered by the
assault by prisoner statute, and not by the assault on a correctional officer statute. See
State v. Chaney, 1999 UT App 309, ff 40-43, 989 P.2d 1091 (distinguishing Hilt).
A.

Defendant's conduct of using a table to slam the deputy into a wall does
not fit within the elements of assault on a correctional officer.
When determining an issue of statutory interpretation, "[an appellate court]

begin[s] [its] analysis by examining the plain language of the applicable statutes and
appl[ies] other methods of statutory interpretation only when the language is either
ambiguous or inconsistent." State v. Mast, 2001 UT App 402, If 10, 40 P.3d 1143
(quotations and citations omitted). Under a plain language interpretation, u[e]ach term in
a statute should be interpreted according to its usual and commonly accepted meaning."
State v. Paul, 860 P.2d 992, 993 (Utah App. 1993).
Defendant's conduct does not fit within the limited plain language of section 76-5102.6—assault on a correctional officer. Section 76-5-102.6 provides that "[a]ny
prisoner who throws or otherwise propels fecal material or any other substance or object
at a peace or correctional officer is guilty of a class A misdemeanor. Utah Code Ann. §
76-5-102.6 (1999) (emphasis added). Here, by his own admission, defendant did not
"throw" or "propel" anything at the deputy. Rather, defendant admitted that he only
"knocked over," "pushed over," "picked up," "tipped," "overturned," or "flipped" the

9

table into Deputy Knapp's lap and then used the table to force the deputy into the wall.
SeeR. 144:125,128,135-37,142.
In State v. Paul, 860 P.2d 992 (Utah App. 1993), this Court held that "[t]he only
way a prisoner can assault a correctional officer under [section 76-5-102.6] is to 'throw'
something at the officer." Id. at 994. For purposes of section 76-5-102.6, this Court
defined "throw" according to its commonly understood meaning: "(1) 'to propel through
the air by means of a sudden straightening or whirling of the arm,' Webster's Illustrated
Contemporary Dictionary 768 (1982); (2) 'to propel through the air with a swift motion
of the arm,' The American Heritage Dictionary 1314 (2d ed. 1985); and (3) 'to send
through the air with a motion of the hand or arm,' Roget's II, The New Thesaurus 1012
(expanded ed. 1988)." Paul, 860P.2d at 993-94 (also noting that "[t]he only way a
prisoner can assault a correctional officer under [section 76-5-102.6] is to 'throw'
something at the officer."). Similarly, the word "propel" is defined as "to impel forward
or onward." Webster's Third New International Dictionary 1817(1993). See also Paul,
860, P.2d at 994 ("Under the plain language of [section 76-5-102.6], the only prohibited
means of propelling a [ n ] . . . object is by the act of throwing.").
Given Paul and defendant's own testimony, he did not "throw" or "propel"
anything. Accordingly, his conduct does not fit within the elements of assault on a
correctional officer. Therefore, the trial court did not err in denying defendant motion to
amend the information.

10

B.

Defendant's conduct more specifically falls under the assault by prisoner
statute.
Defendant's claim also fails because his conduct went well beyond that of assault

on a correctional officer. Although entitled "Assault on a correctional officer," the
assault element in section 76-5-102.6 is limited to a prisoner who "throws or otherwise
propels . . . any . . . object at a peace or correctional officerf.]" Utah Code Ann. § 76-5102.6 (1999) (emphasis added); Paul, 860 P.2d at 994. By contrast, the assault element
of the assault by prisoner statute is much broader, encompassing "[a]ny prisoner who
commits assault, intending to cause bodily injury[.]" Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-102.6 (1999)
(emphasis added). Assault is defined as either "(b) a threat, accompanied by a show of
immediate force or violence, to do bodily injury to another; or (c) an act, committed with
unlawful force or violence, that causes or creates a substantial risk of bodily injury to
another." Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-102 (Supp. 2001).
Here, defendant threatened Deputy Knapp that "you will be in a fight, if you start
this shit[,]" and then that he would "break [his] neck, straight up[,]" and kick his
"f[uck]ing ass." R. 144:63-66, 106. Defendant accompanied that threat by an immediate
show of violence by tipping the table onto the deputy's lap and then using the table to
slam the deputy against the back wall. See R. 144-67-68; Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-102.6
(1999); Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-102 (Supp. 2001). Clearly, defendant's threats went
beyond the limited elements of section 76-5-102.5. See Utah Code Ann. 76-5-102.5
(1999). Additionally, defendant's further act of using the table and driving his legs
11

forward to slam the deputy into the wall constituted 6*an act, committed with unlawful
force or violence, that.. . creates a substantial risk of bodily injury to [the deputy.]" See
R. 144-67-68; Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-102.5 (1999); Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-102.6
(1999); Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-102 (Supp. 2001). As the jury found, defendant's threats
followed up by using the table to slam the deputy into the wall, evinced an intent to cause
bodily injury. Thus, defendant's conduct clearly fell outside the limited elements of
assault on a correctional officer, and fell squarely within the elements of assault by
prisoner. Accordingly, the trial court did not err in denying defendant's request to amend
the information to the lesser charge.
CONCLUSION
Based upon the foregoing, the State respectfully requests that this Court affirm the
trial court's ruling denying defendant's motion to amend his charge of assault by prisoner
to the lesser included offense of assault on a correctional officer.
Dated this

V ^ d a y of May, 2002.
MARK L. SHURTLEFF
Utah Attorney General

JEFpfekY t COLEMERE
Assistant Attorney General
Attorneys for Appellee

12
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